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ABSTRACT. If economic growth elsewhere raises an individual’s earning prospects
relative to his present location, then the individual will move. However, if the individual
can exploit economic growth elsewhere by commuting, he will not need to move to gain
from the expansion. County-level data from eight states in the Midwest over the period
1969–1994areusedtoshowthatlocalcountypopulationrespondspositivelytoown-county
economic growth, economic growth in the adjacent county, and economic growth two
countiesaway.Themagnitudeoftheeffectdecreasesasdistancefromthecountyincreases,
and turns negative beyond a three county radius.
1. INTRODUCTION
All fifty states of the United States have publicly sponsored economic
development efforts designed to attract new firms. In principle, each state
competes with 49 others in attracting new firms, offering tax incentives, low-
interest or forgivable loans, worker training grants, and other inducements.
Similarly, individual communities, through chambers of commerce or local
economic development agencies, attempt to attract new firms, sometimes com-
peting with other communities in the same state.1 However, it is not clear, that
all economic gains in one community are at the expense of other communities.
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1Research on whether these incentives actually alter the competitive positions of states and
cities,andinfluencethefirmlocationdecisionisinconclusive.Mostrecently,FisherandPeters(1998)
find that discretionary tax and nontax incentives do not change the competitive positions of states
and cities. Although areas with the poorest incentives and highest taxes will be eliminated from
consideration in firm location decisions, in most cases the impact of incentives is uncertain.
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commutingdistancemaybenefitratherthanbeharmedbythefirstcommunity’s
good fortune. On the other hand, if the two municipalities are farther apart,
workers in one location will have to move to the other city in order to benefit
from that city’s economic expansion. This suggests that the limits of a locality’s
labor market can be established by whether its population rises or falls in
response to economic growth in its surrounding communities.
Many papers have documented that population growth and employment
growth within a metropolitan area are jointly determined. For example, Green-
wood, Hunt, and McDowell (1986) found that an increase of two jobs increases
population by one, and that when population rises by two, there is an average
increase of one job. Other papers exploring the joint determination of local
population and employment growth include Boarnet (1994); Carlino and Mills
(1987); and Clark and Murphy (1996). Less is known about the impacts of
employment growth in one community on population growth elsewhere.
There has been increasing interest in how these economic activities spill
over to  other  jurisdictions. Much  of the current research on interregional
interactions builds on Roback’s (1992) pioneering model that allows interre-
gional amenity differences to be priced into interregional differences in wages
and land rents. Early applications of these models were concerned with
processes of suburbanization, urban decline, and overall metropolitan growth.
In this interregional framework, population and economic activity in a metro-
politanregionadjusttoallowforanefficientdistributionoffirmsandindividuals
(Adams et al., 1994; Benabou, 1993; Henry, Barkley, and Bao, 1997). Other
applications of this interregional modeling approach have examined the local
versus regional effects of amenities,(Blomquist,Berger,and Hoehn,1988;Voith,
1991, 1993) and the bidirectional effects of public investments and economic
activities in cities and suburbs (Voith, 1998). In each of these studies, economic
activities occurring in one region are found to generate broader regional effects
and economic adjustments, rather than only occurring locally.
FollowingtheworkofAlonso(1964),Mills(1967),andMuth(1969),weknow
that equilibrium wages and housing prices should decline as distance from an
urban core increases.Empirical work by McMillen and Singell (1992) and White
(1988) confirm the existence of these housing price and wage gradients. This
evidence suggests thatanincrease inlabordemandinacentralcityshouldraise
incentivestolocateinboththecenter andtheperiphery.The equilibriumresults
suggest thatthere exists some maximum distancefrom thecenterbeyondwhich
economic growth in the center will no longer raise population in the periphery
and will begin to decrease the periphery’s population.2 However, although the
2This has been termed the spread-backwash model from regional economics. Gaile’s (1980)
review of that literature concluded that empirical work to date on the spread-backwash model had
been disappointing. The Henry, Barkley, and Bao (1997) study suggests that empirical work since
the Gaile paper was published have continued to provide little support for the spread-backwash
model, although their own paper did find modest support.
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the limits of that critical distance have not been well established.
This study builds on the earlier work by documenting the magnitude and
the limits of cross-county complementary economic growth. Rather than tying
the model to the existence of a definable central city and its surroundings, the
theoretical model applies generally to any community and its neighbors. The
model is tested with county-level data from eight states in the Midwest over the
period 1969–1994.County population is explained by county wage growth,wage
growth in adjacent and nonadjacent counties, and national wage growth. The
specificationisrepeatedusinginformationonjobgrowthandonwagebillgrowth
(wages times jobs).Empirical estimates correct for possible simultaneous deter-
mination of local economic growth measures and local population.
The results are quite consistent, regardless of how economic growth is
measured or what additional controls are added for local amenities or fiscal
policies. Local county population responds positively to own-county economic
growth, economic growth in the adjacent county, and even economic growth two
countiesaway.Themagnitudeoftheeffectdecreasesasdistancefromthecounty
increases.Ontheotherhand,economicgrowthbeyondadistanceoftwocounties
lowers population, presumably because change of residence is required if the
local population is to benefit from distant economic growth. The pattern of
results differs depending on the size of the county. In particular, if economic
growthisuniformacrossallcountiesintheMidwest,theleastpopulouscounties
will lose population while the most populous counties will get larger.
These results suggest that economic growth is complementary within a
three-county radius and competitive outside that radius. Presumably then, it is
wasteful for one county’s economic development efforts to attempt to compete
with the efforts of neighboring counties or those counties’ neighbors. Instead,
cooperative efforts to attract a business to the area would still insure at least
partial benefit to all counties in the region, regardless of which county the firm
selects.
2. A MODEL OF POPULATION GROWTH
This section develops a stylized, estimable model of county population
growth in a county,0,which incorporates the effects of economic growth in other
counties. To begin, assume that a representative agent’s indirect utility from
residing in county 0 at time t depends on income opportunities available in the
county and its surroundings,and on the hedonic value of living amenities in the
county, A0t. The local amenities include local meteorological and topographic
attributes that do not vary over time, although the hedonic value of those
attributes may vary over time.
Income opportunities in county 0 include working in the local county at real
wageW0,twithnocommutingcostorworkinginanothercountyk,andabsorbing
commuting costs Ck,t in exchange for receiving wages Wk,t. The indirect utility
of the representative agent living in county 0 is specified as U0,t(W0,t,W k,t,C k,t,
© Blackwell Publishers 2001.
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vector of real wages, and Ck,t is a vector of commuting costs for counties within
commuting distance, k = 1,...,K. Similarly, for an individual living in county 0,
the utility associated with residing in another county m outside commuting
distance can be expressed as Um,t(Wm,t,Mm,t,A m,t) where Wm,t is the prevailing
real market wage,Mm,t is the cost of moving from county 0 to county m,and Am,t
is the value of amenities.
At time t, an individual will want to maximize utility by deciding where to
locate based on a comparison of utilities across all counties, Ui,t, i = 0,...N.This
decision is written as
U = Max (U0,t, U1,t,...,UN,t)
where Ui,t is the utility for county i, and N is the number of counties. Conse-
quently,the utility of an individual in any county can be expressed as a function
of all county wage levels, moving and commuting costs between counties, and
local amenities.3
(1) Ut = Max (U0,t, U1,t,...,UN,t)
= Ut(W0,t, A0,t, W1,t,...WN,t, C1,t,...CN,t, M1,t,...MN,t, A1,t,...AN,t)
Suppose an individual initially resides in county 0. Equation (1) implies that at
any time t, an individual will move to county n if conditions change so that
Max (U0,t,U 1,t,...UN,t)= Un,t.Thus,P0,t, the population level in county 0 at time t,
can be expressed as a function of the utility levels across all counties, which are
in turn a function of the wages, commuting costs, and moving costs for all
counties. In notation,
(2) P0,t = G(U0,t,..., UN,t)
To make Equation (2) tractable empirically, we need to specify functional
forms for G and Uj,t.Assuming a Cobb-Douglas form for Uj,t,the utility functions
will be
(3)
where γi >0are the relative weights on wages, βi <0are the relative utility
weights on migration costs to county i, δi <0are the relative weights on
commuting costs, and are the relative weights on local amenities in the
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3Later we will substitute local jobs and local income for local wages in our utility function.For
the most part, our results are quite similar regardless of how spatially differentiated local labor
market growth is measured.
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of utility, so that using Equation (3)
(4)
where α is a constant of proportionality.
TakingnaturallogarithmsofEquation(4)anddifferencingbetweenperiods
t and t + k, we get
(5)
Our primary interest is in the coefficients on spatially distributed economic
growth. However, we must first specify how we can control for the other factors
in Equation (5).
Moving costs will be dominated by factors that are common across counties
such as fuel and transportation equipment. Although there will be variation in
these costs across counties,all N county moving costs are included in the utility
function. Consequently, there will be little cross-sectional variation in moving
costs although there will be variation over time. This justifies a simplification
of the moving cost formulation for county 0, as
(6)
where is an error term with mean zero.
Changes in commuting costs will reflect changes in the value of time in the
local labor market. Transportation costs may also change at different rates in
small towns versus urban areas.Therefore,we specify the commuting cost from
county 0 to county 1 as4
(7)
The coefficient on wage growth would be expected to become more
negative as distance from county 0 increases.
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problem with the dependent variable.
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(8)
where AMENITYj is an index for the quality of local weather and topographic
features, and R0,t is the rental cost of housing. To the extent that valued local
amenities are capitalized in rental costs, the net impact of the amenities will be
diminished.
All N other local amenities enter Equation (6), but there will be little
difference in the weighted average of these amenities across counties as N gets
large. Therefore, we approximate
(9)




The value of γ0 determines how the population responds to own-county wage
growth.The signsofΓiindicate whether wages in a county i raise or lower utility
in the own county relative to utility elsewhere. We expect wages in the own
county will raise U0,t, holding other county wages constant, so that γ0 > 0.
However, can be positive or negative. While wages alone would
raise utility so that γi > 0, commuting costs would lower utility so that
. As distance from county 0 to county i increases, becomes more
negative. We would also expect that more distant wage  growth  would  be
discounted more heavily so that γi becomes less positive. Consequently, as
distance from county 0 increases, Γi should get smaller and eventually turn
negative.
The signs on Γi for adjacent and nonadjacent counties are relevant for
understanding linkages between counties in terms of complementary versus
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requires that Γi > 0. Therefore, a positive value of Γi implies the existence of
complementary growth between counties 0 and i. A negative value for Γi means
that the disutility of the commute to i exceeds the value of the wage. This
indicates the presence of competing growth between counties 0 and i. Workers
in county 0 would have to migrate in order to benefit from wages in county i.
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
We estimate Equation (10) using four measures of spatially distributed
wage growth: ln[W0,t+k/W0,t] for the own county, ln(W1,t+k/W1,t) for an adjacent
county, ln(W2,t+k/W2,t) for wage growth in a nonadjacent county (two counties
away from j), and ln(Ws,t+k/Ws,t) for wage growth in the rest of the state that is
orthogonaltowagegrowthinthetwo-countyradiusofcountyj.5Earlierversions
using wage growth three counties away rather than the state-wide measure
yielded similar results to those reported herein.
Local population growth and local economic growth are undoubtedly deter-
mined simultaneously. Consequently, we specified instruments for own-county
wage growth. We selected instruments based on a stylized representation of a
locallabormarketmodelsubjecttolaggedadjustments.Carrington(1996)found
that it took two years for wages and employment to adjust to labor demand
shocks associated with the Alaska pipeline. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)
report a one-to-two-year lagged effect of unemployment rates on regional and
state wages.
Such a model is illustrated in Figure 1. Real wages Wt and employment, Jt
are determined by labor supply and demand conditions, but with a lag. To ease
exposition, we standardize labor market size by dividing employment by popu-
lation size. The employment rate, Jt/Pt varies between zero and unity. Given
prevailing demand and supply conditions for labor Jt/Pt reaches a maximum
possible value when the wage is at equilibrium . Any departure from
equilibriumwillresultina lower valuefor Jt/Pt,regardlessof whetherthewage
is above or below equilibrium.
Supposethattheemploymentrateisgivenby inFigure1.Ifthewage
is so that we have excess supply of labor, there will be downward pressure
on future wages. If the wage is , there is excess demand for labor so that
wages will rise in the future. As a consequence, holding Jt/Pt constant, high
values of Wt will lead to lower values of Wt+k as the market tends toward











5To reduce potential problems of simultaneity,we chose the largest county 1,2,and 3 counties
away rather than averaging across all counties. Wages in the largest county would be less affected
by population changes in county 0 than would the average county. Job information flows and
commutinglinkagesshouldbemostestablishedbetweencounty0anditslargestneighboringcounty
than with its smaller neighboring counties.
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cannot predict the effect of Jt/Pton future wages.
On the other hand, holding Wt constant, low values of Jt/Pt will lead to
higherfutureemploymentasthemarketadjuststowardequilibrium.Therefore,
we would expect low values of Jt/Pt to signal higher values of Jt+k. As is clear
from Figure 1,we cannot sign the relationship between Wt and Jt+k. Both wages
that are above equilibrium ( ) and wages that are below equilibrium (Wt
1)
would imply an increase in future employment as the labor market adjusts
toward equilibrium.
This simple sticky-wage model of local labor markets suggests that one can
forecast future wage and employment growth in a county using information on
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FIGURE 1: Local Labor Demand and Supply.
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curves.6 Given the earlier discussion, the model predicts that a1 < 0 and b2 < 0.
The theory does not generate predictions about the signs of the other
parameters.
4. DATA
The primary data source is the county-level employment, population and
earnings information compiled by the Bureau of Economic Analysis over the
years 1969 to 1994. The states included in the sample are Iowa, Kansas, South
Dakota, Nebraska, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri. These states
were chosen because a significant proportion of the population resided in
nonrural, nonmetropolitan locations. This assures us of considerable variation
in county population. There were a total of 737 counties. We designate a county
as URBAN if either it or an adjacent county has a population above 50,000 in
1969. By that criteria, 277 counties were urban. Counties were of comparable
geographic size across states and were arranged in a similar grid pattern.
Comparable grid patterns make it more sensible to assume equal population
supply responses to economic growth one or two counties away.
We divide the time period into five subperiods of five years each. The base
periods were 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, and 1989. The growth rates for population
and average wage per job were measured over five year intervals: 1969–1974,
1974–1979, 1979–1984, 1984–1989, and  1989–1994. This yielded five  time
periods for every state, bringing the total number of observations to 3,685. A
five-year period should provide a sufficiently long time to capture the long run
population response to changes in local and surrounding labor markets. It also
sidesteps potentialcomplicationsduetoshort-term commoncyclicalshocksthat
could exaggerate the positive correlation between local wages and employment.
Population is defined as the totalnumber of people livingin the county.Jobs
are defined as the total number of people working in the county. It is important
to emphasize the distinction between the measures of population and employ-
ment.County population includes those living in the county,but not necessarily
working in the county. Wage and employment data are from all people working
in the county including those who commute to the county but live elsewhere,
and excluding those who live in the county but work elsewhere. In this way, we
are able to separate labor market variables from population responses.
The sample statistics are reported in Table 1. Population growth has been
modest over the period, averaging one-half of one percent every five years.
However, counties in the lowest quartile population over the period shrank an
average of 2.7 percent per five-year period, and the most populated counties
ln , ln PP tt bg di
2
2
6Higher population will shift labor supply to the right as well as create a demand for labor to
provide local goods and services.To the extent that urban areas have lower commuting or job search
costs or enjoy agglomeration economies that make labor more productive,wewould observedemand
and supply shifts as we move from rural to urban markets.
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between counties,althoughthere was a clear wage gap between urbanand rural
counties.Workers in intermediate counties received about a 5 percent premium
and those in the largest counties received a 10 percent premium over the pay in
the least populous counties. The clear advantage in the largest counties was in
job andwage billgrowthand notwagegrowthperse.Bothmeasures ofeconomic
growth were around 2.5 times higher in the upper quartile counties than in the
lowest quartile counties. Employment rates were also highest in the largest
counties.This implies that job growth in smaller counties can be accommodated
TABLE 1: Selected Sample Statistics, by County Population Quartilesa
Variables Mean and Standard Deviations
Population Groups
Lower Quartile Upper Quartile
Entire Sample (= 8,000) Middle Quartiles (= 29,600)
ln(P0,t+5/P0,t): Population Growth
c 0.005 –0.027 0.008 0.033
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.057)
ln(W0,t+5/W0,t): Real Wage Growth
c, d –0.005 –0.003 –0.004 –0.010
(0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
ln(J0,t+5/J0,t): Job Growth
c 0.071 0.036 0.079 0.089
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.10)
ln(I0,t+5/I0,t): Wage Bill Growth
c, d 0.065 0.032 0.075 0.079
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
Pt: Population (‘000)
c 43.8 4.83 16.0 138.3
(212.6) (2.03) (5.70) (410.7)
(Jt/Pt): Employment Rate
c 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.40
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (.10)
Wt: Real Annual Wage (‘000)
c, d 12.80 12.2 12.81 13.39
(2.54) (2.37) (2.47) (2.72)
Jt: Jobs (‘000)
c 18.9 1.35 5.0 64.5
(109.8) (0.66) (2.9) (213.1)
URBAN: Own or Adjacent
Population over 50,000
c 0.38 0.09 0.34 0.74
(0.48) (0.29) (0.47) (0.44)
AMENITY: U.S.D.A. Natural
Amenity Scale
e 2.74 2.92 2.68 2.67





aStandard errors in parentheses.
bState-level variable which does not vary by county.
cBureau of Economic Analysis: county-level data on income, employment and population.
dDeflated by the Consumer Price Index for Urban Consumers.
eU.S.D.A.-E.R.S.: natural amenities county-level data file.
fU.S. Census of Housing: median real contract rent plus the cost of utilities.
ln Rt
H di
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likely require inmigration of new workers.Later on,we will find that population
growth is indeed most responsive to economic growth in the biggest counties
and least responsive in the smallest counties.
AMENITY is an index of environmental quality compiled by the U.S.D.A.
The index, which ranges from 1 to 6, rates an area higher for warm Januarys,
mild Julys, sunny days in January, low July humidity, varied topography, and
percentage of water coverage.There is some variation across counties,with less
populated areas rated somewhat higher on average than more populated coun-
ties.Housing costs were measured by the real gross rental price,which includes
utility costs as well as rent.These are reported in the Census of Housing for the
state. For the intercensus years, these measures were interpolated assuming a
constant growth rate.
5. POPULATION GROWTH FROM SPATIALLY DIFFERENTIATED
WAGE GROWTH
The results of two-stage generalized least squares (GLS) estimation of
Equation (10) are presented in Table 2. Twenty-two percent of the variation
in  population  growth  is  explained by the model. The coefficients in the
population growth equation are interpretable alternatively as elasticities of
utility with respect to wage levels, net of commuting costs, or as elasticities
of population growth with respect to wage growth in each area. As one would
expect, increased wage growth in a county raises the utility from residence
in that county and attracts migrants.The estimates in column one imply that
a 10 percent increase in local county wage growth results in a 7.2 percent
increase in local population growth. The coefficients Γ1 and Γ2 indicate how
wage growth in the adjacent and nonadjacent counties affect population
growth in the own county.Positive Γ1 indicates complementary growth effects
between adjacent counties. The coefficient implies that 10 percent wage
growth  one  county  away  will raise local  county population by just over
1p e r c e n t .Γ2isalsopositivebutsmallerstill,sothata10percentwagegrowth
twocountiesawayraiseslocalcountypopulationbylessthan1percent.These
results suggest that the relevant county labor market as defined by popula-
tion responses to spatially differentiated wage growth includes the home
county, adjacent counties, and the counties adjacent to them. Wage growth
outside that range lowers home county population, consistent with the
presumption that wage growth outside the local labor market raises utility
elsewhere relative to home county utility, and thus causes outmigration.7
The size of the local labor market varies with population size. As indi-
cated by the test of structural equivalency, the null hypothesis that the
coefficients are identical across the small, medium, and large counties was
7We also estimated the model using national wage growth in place of the state wage growth
measure. The results were very similar.
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Wage Growtha
Variables Estimated Coefficients and t-Ratios
Full Lower Middle Upper Unrestricted,
Sample Quartile Quartiles Quartile Full Sample
Stage 2
γ0: ln(W0,t+5/W0,t)
b 0.718** –0.067 0.672** 2.00** —
(5.38) (0.39) (3.78) (4.10)
Γ1: ln(W1,t+5/W1,t) 0.105** 0.015 0.105** 0.262** 0.111**
(5.34) (0.039) (3.98) (6.91) (5.67)
Γ2: ln(W2,t+5/W2,t) 0.078** 0.158** 0.052** 0.054 0.084**
(3.81) (3.39) (1.99) (1.33) (4.10)
ΓS: ln(WS,t+5/WS,t)
Residual –0.305** –0.480** –0.247** –0.302** –0.298**
(7.86) (5.22) (4.81) (4.18) (7.68)
AMENITY 0.013** 0.019** 0.017** 0.006** 0.015**
(8.90) (6.24) (8.16) (2.11) (10.1)
URBAN 0.018** 0.017** 0.011** 0.026** .017**
(8.08) (3.02) (4.17) (6.28) (7.97)
–0.012** –0.013** –0.020** –0.006 –0.011**
(5.40) (2.96) (6.60) (1.36) (5.02)
ln(Pt) 0.016** 0.011** 0.033** –0.009** –0.039**
(14.3) (2.74) (9.27) (3.27) (12.4)
Constant –0.014 0.012** –0.024 0.088** —
(1.12) (2.74) (1.23) (3.53)
R
2 0.22 0.13 0.18 0.15
Stage 1
b1: ln(Pt) 0.003 0.011 –0.106 –0.014 —
(1.00) (0.55) (1.44) (1.06)
b2: [ln(Pt)]
2 –0.0001 –0.0005 0.021** –0.002 –0.003**
(0.11) (0.06) (1.56) (1.38) (7.16)
b3: ln(Et/Pt) –0.030** –0.048** –0.026** –0.009 –.022**
(6.73) (4.35) (3.06) (1.10) (4.95)
b4: ln(Wt) –0.025** –0.024 –0.031** –0.016* –0.007
(3.94) (1.59) (3.37) (1.72) (1.49)
b5: URBAN –0.001 –0.001 0.002 0.004 —
(0.32) (0.17) (0.51) (0.09)
Constant 0.188** 0.145 0.387** 0.162* –0.017
(3.15) (1.01) (2.77) (1.68) (0.36)
R
2 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.23
N 3685 935 1828 922 3685
Test of Structural Equivalence 15.1**
Sum of Coefficients
γ0 + Γ1 + Γ2 + ΓS 0.60 –0.37 0.58 2.01
Test of Wage Neutrality 19.2** 3.47* 10.9** 16.0**
aRobust t-statistics in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the .10 level. Two
asterisks indicate significance at the .05 level.
bPredicted, based on the Stage 1 equation below.
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746 JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 41, NO. 4, 2001easily rejected.8 Curiously, county population growth is insensitive to local
wage growth and adjacent county wage growth in the smallest counties. Only
wage growth two counties away significantly adds population in the smallest
counties. For intermediate counties, wage growth in the own, adjacent, and
nonadjacentcountiescause homecountypopulationtoincrease,whilehomeand
adjacent county wage growth are most important in the largest counties. The
population elasticity with respect to own county wages increases as county size
increases. At the same time, wage growth outside the three-county radius (own
plus adjacent plus nonadjacent) has the greatest negative effect on the smallest
counties.
Common wage shocks across all markets might be expected to leave local
population unchanged. However, wage changes might not be neutral if demand
for localamenities varies withincomeor ifcommutingtimecostsdonotincrease
equally across counties. Consequently, common wage changes across all areas
may cause a given county’s population to grow, decline or remain unchanged.
The impactofsuchanequiproportionalwageshockoncountypopulationgrowth
in the sample is the sum of the population elasticities, γ0 + Γ1 + Γ2 + ΓN. The
summed effects are presented in Table 2 with an associated test statistic for the
restriction that the sum is zero (labeled the test of wage neutrality). We reject
the null hypothesis that uniform wage growth has no effect on population
growth. Overall, a uniform ten percent wage increase across all regions raises
population in these states by six percent. However, the largest counties grow
faster than wages, while the smallest counties shrink. The implication is that
equiproportional wage growth causes a population shift toward larger counties
and away from smaller counties, other things equal.
The other coefficients also have interesting implications for population
growth. Physical amenities are associated with more rapid population growth
while higher housing costs reduce population growth.Consequently, the impact
of amenities on population growth depends upon the extent to which physical
amenities are capitalized in local housing costs. Holding housing costs fixed, a
one-unit increase in AMENITY (equal to a 1.5 standard deviation increase) will
raise population growth by 1.3 percent over 5 years. The effect is largest in the
smallest counties, and very small in the largest counties. Population growth in
the largest counties is also virtually insensitive to housing costs.URBAN status
is generally associated with faster population growth in all counties. Counties
with higher population initially also grow faster except for the largest counties.
As noted in the previous section, we expected that wage growth in the
own county and perhaps in adjacent counties might be endogenous.We tested
for endogenous wage growth in the following way.First,we assumed all wage
growth measures were exogenous to local population growth and then tested
that specification against one which assumed own county wage growth was
8This tests the joint restrictions that, other than the constant terms, the coefficients in the
second-stage population growth equations are equal across small, medium and large counties. The
test is distributed F(16, 3660).
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KHAN, ORAZEM, & OTTO: SPATIAL LABOR MARKETS 747endogenous. The null hypothesis of exogenous own county wage growth was
easily rejected.9 We then relaxed the assumption of exogenous wage growth in
the largest adjacent county. This time the Hausman test failed to reject the null
hypothesis, supporting the specification employed.
Although providing identification, the coefficient of determination (R2) for
the first-stage Equation (11) is very small.Despite the weak fit,the results from
the instrumenting equation are consistent with the local labor market model
outlinedabove.Asrequiredbythetheory,holdingtheemploymentrateconstant,
higher wage levels cause wages to decrease in subsequent years. The employ-
ment rate also serves as a significant identifier, but the other coefficients are
not precisely estimated.10 As an additional check,we estimated the unrestricted
version of the model, dropping own-county wage growth. The parameters on
spatial wagegrowthreported inthelastcolumn of Table2arenearlyunchanged
from those in the first column. The implied local labor market still spans a
three-county radius, and the roles of local amenities and housing costs are
unchanged.
6. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
Having investigated the relationship between population growth and wage
growth, we consider alternative measures of economic growth that may also
raise home county utility. This is particularly important if county population
responds more to job growth than to growth in earnings per job. This is done by
substituting measures of job growth [(ln(Ji, t+5/Ji,t)] for wage growth in Equa-
tion (11). Alternatively, population may respond to growth in both wages and
jobs. We measure wage bill growth [(ln(Ii, t+5/Ii,t)] by growth in the total wage
and salary earnings for the people working in the county.
Population Growth from Spatially Differentiated Job Growth
The results of the two-stage GLS estimation using job growth as the
explanatory variable are presented in Table 3. The second-stage model fit is
similar to that in Table 2. The coefficients in the upper portion of the table
represent elasticities of population growth with respect to spatially differenti-
ated job growth.A broad brush characterization of the results is that job growth
and wage growth characterize spatially differentiated economic growth simi-
larly. As in Table 2, the implied population response to job growth over the full
9The null hypothesis of exogenous own county wage growth was rejected with a marginal
significancelevellessthan0.01.Thenullhypothesisofexogenouswagegrowthintheadjacentcounty
could only be rejected at the 0.55 marginal significance level.Nevertheless,we attempted estimates
that instrument both own and adjacent county wage growth. The results for the full sample were
nearlyidenticaltothoseinTable2.ConsistentwithTable2,therewasnoevidenceofcomplementary
growth beyond the adjacent county.In addition,the coefficient on residual state wage growth in the
largest counties turns negative.
10Although they use a different model strategy, the results reported herein are broadly
consistent with those reported in Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1995, Table 3). There, higher
initial city income leads to lower city income growth.
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748 JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 41, NO. 4, 2001TABLE 3: Regressions of Population Growth on Spatially Differentiated Job
Growtha
Variables Estimated Coefficients and t-Ratios
Full Lower Middle Upper Unrestricted,
Sample Quartile Quartiles Quartile Full Sample
α0: ln(J0,t+5/J0,t)
b 0.227** 0.17** 0.154** 0.528** —
(6.67) (0.27) (3.18) (8.78)
α1: ln(J1,t+5/J1,t) 0.070** 0.088** 0.080** 0.081** 0.070**
(6.37) (2.18) (5.12) (4.59) (6.50)
α2: ln(J2,t+5/J2,t) 0.022** 0.009 0.033** –0.014 0.024**
(2.13) (0.38) (2.29) (0.72) (2.31)
αS: ln(JS,t+5/JS,t)
Residual –0.182** –0.329** –0.176** –0.017 –0.179**
(7.72) (6.96) (5.38) (0.38) (7.46)
AMENITY 0.013** 0.017** 0.016** 0.006** 0.014**
(8.75) (5.50) (7.82) (2.23) (9.29)
URBAN 0.015** 0.015** 0.011** 0.016** 0.015**
(6.92) (2.64) (4.09) (3.89) (7.04)
–0.014** –0.015** –0.022** –0.001 –0.015**
(6.22) (3.47) (7.11) (0.14) (6.66)
ln(Pt) 0.011** 0.007 0.027** –0.004 0.037**
(8.47) (1.55) (6.76) (1.61) (11.3)
Constant –0.016 –0.012 –0.021 –0.029 —
(1.30) (0.48) (1.07) (1.10)
R
2 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.19
c1: ln(Pt) 0.053** –0.007 –0.114 0.112** —
(10.2) (0.35) (1.01) (5.26)
c2: [ln(Pt)]
2 –0.003** 0.016* 0.033 –0.009** –0.003**
(3.75) (1.82) (1.58) (4.64) (6.26)
c3: ln(Jt/Pt) –0.125** –0.137** –0.122** –0.150** –0.021**
(17.6) (0.16) (9.80) (9.54) (4.64)
c4: ln(Wt) –0.054** 0.014 –0.080** –0.09** –0.011**
(5.34) (0.73) (5.26) (5.54) (2.17)
c5: URBAN 0.003 –0.016 –0.003 –0.008 0.015**
(0.68) (1.64) (0.49) (1.01) (7.04)
Constant 0.318** –0.304 0.744** 0.526** 0.035
(3.32) (1.64) (3.32) (3.20) (0.72)
R
2 0.11 0.11 0.09 00.14 0.23
N 3685 935 1828 922 3685
Test of Structural Equivalence 12.3**
Sum of Coefficients
γ0 + Γ1 + Γ2 + ΓS 0.14 –0.26 0.09 0.58
Test of Job Growth Neutrality 10.2** 8.86** 2.6 57.0**
aRobust t-statistics in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the .10 level. Two
asterisks indicate significance at the .05 level.
bPredicted, based on the Stage 1 equation below.
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KHAN, ORAZEM, & OTTO: SPATIAL LABOR MARKETS 749sample remains positive as far as two counties away. The magnitude of the
population growth response becomes smaller as the job growth becomes more
distant. A 10 percent growth in jobs raises population by 2.3 percent when the
jobs are in the own county, by 0.7 percent when the job growth is in an adjacent
county, and 0.2 percent when the job growth is two counties away. Job growth
beyond two counties distance induces outmigration, implying that the relevant
county labor market includes adjacent and nonadjacent counties.11
The rest of the second-stage coefficients are similar to those in Table 2 in
both sign and magnitude. The local labor market model also performs as
expected, except that the fit is considerably better than in Table 2. The model
predicted that,holding wages fixed,higher employment rates in the base period
would lead to slower future job growth. This prediction holds in the data.12 All
in all, the instrumenting equations in Tables 2 and 3 are quite consistent with
the simple sticky-wage model of local labor markets.
When we break the sample down by population size, we find that the job
growth complementarities extend to nonadjacent counties for medium counties.
The largest and smallest counties only gain from job growth in the own and
adjacentcounties.Populationgrowthinthesmallestcountiesismoreresponsive
to own county job growth than to own county wage growth. Consequently, jobs
are more important than wages in maintaining population in the smallest
counties. However, job growth outside the two-county radius has its largest
adverse impact in the smallest counties, but virtually no adverse effect in the
largest counties.
As before, we test for the structural equivalence of relationships between
counties and find that there are significant differences in the population growth
elasticitieswithrespecttojobgrowthbetweencountiesofdifferentsizes.Aswith
wage growth, equiproportional job growth across all areas causes outmigration
from the smallest counties. The population responds positively to equipropor-
tional job growth in the more populous counties. Overall, 10 percent job growth
across all markets raises population by 1.4 percent over 5 years in these states.
Using sample means for jobs and population in Table 1, this suggests that an
increase of 1 job raises population by 0.3 residents. This corresponds well to the
Greenwood, Hunt, and McDowell (1986) study that found an additional job led
to 0.5 new residents.
We reestimate the model relaxing the parametric restrictions. As shown in
the last column of Table 3, the unrestricted parameters imply a local labor
market that extends to the next two counties. The signs and magnitudes of the
11Hausman’s specification tests supported the exogeneity assumption for job growth outside
the own county.The marginal significance level for the test of own-county exogenous job growth was
below 0.0001, but was 0.24 for exogenous adjacent county job growth.
12Glaeser,Scheinkman,and Shleifer (1995,Table 5),found higher unemployment rates led to
slower growth in their sample of cities. Their results would seem to be inconsistent with standard
models of labor market equilibrium. However, it is possible that their model includes cities with
different equilibrium unemployment rates, a problem we are unlikely to face in our more homoge-
neous sample of counties.
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with those reported in Table 2.
Population Growth from Spatially Differentiated Income Growth
The results of the estimation using growth in the wage bill I0,t = W0,tJ0,t are
presented in Table 4. Inserting the real wage bill in place of real wages into the
specification of Equation (11) is equivalent to the assumption that W0t and J0t
have the same population elasticity γ0. The model explains 24 percent of the
variation in population growth. The results corroborate the findings in Tables 2
and3,sowewillnotdwellonthemindetail.A10percentincreaseinlocalcounty
wage bill increases population by 1.7 percent. The magnitude of the effect
decreases with distance,but remains positive for counties within a three-county
radius.13 Beyond the three-county radius, wage bill growth competes with local
population growth.
Local wage bill growth is ineffective in raising population in the smallest
counties,andstatewagebillgrowthhasthelargestnegativeeffectonpopulation
growth in those counties. Consequently, wage bill growth is not neutral across
counties. Common wage bill shocks across all counties lower population in the
smallest counties and raise population elsewhere. Overall, the estimated popu-
lation elasticity implies that 10 percent uniform aggregate wage bill growth
raises population across these states by 0.7 percent over five years.
Government Fiscal Policies and Population Growth
Thus far, we have concentrated on the role of exogenous economic growth
and amenities in explaining population growth. There is widespread use of
government fiscal policies to alter population growth patterns, so a natural
extension of our simple spatial framework is to append such policies to our list
of regressors.14 The effectiveness of such policies has not been established. As
Hamilton (1976) pointed out, if property taxes pay for government services
whose value is capitalized by local property values, government tax and expen-
diturepoliciesmayhaveneutraleffectsonlocalpopulationgrowth.Bartik(1991)
found a more promising role for local and state fiscal policies,but still concluded
that the costs and benefits of development policies were of similar magnitudes.
To address this issue, we appended several measures of state and local tax
and expenditure policies by county. All measures were culled from the Compen-
dium of Government Finances, which is published every five years. To avoid
endogeneity between local finance measures and local population growth, we
used the issue that preceded the five-year population growth period.15 The
13The marginal significance levels for tests of exogenous wage bill growth were below 0.0001
for the own-county and 0.13 for the adjacent county.
14We thank the referees for suggesting this extension.
15The Compendia contained data for 1967, 1972 and every five years to 1992. We used 1967
state and local finance data for the population growth period 1969–1974, 1974 data for the
1974–1979 population growth, and so on.
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Income Growtha
Variables Estimated Coefficients and t-Ratios
Full Lower Middle Upper Unrestricted,
Sample Quartile Quartiles Quartile Full Sample
α0: ln(I0,t+5/I0,t)
b 0.166** –0.012 0.118** 0.458** —
(6.17) (0.26) (3.12) (8.37)
α2: ln(I1,t+5/I1,t) 0.061** 0.039* 0.069** 0.085** 0.062**
(7.32) (1.93) (6.19) (6.28) (7.56)
α3: ln(I2,t+5/I2,t) 0.019** 0.013 0.023** –0.001** 0.021**
(2.45) (0.75) (2.87) (0.04) (2.74)
αS: ln(IN,t+5/IN,t)
Residual –0.177** –0.292** –0.167** –0.086 –0.174**
(10.4) (7.68) (7.41) (2.67) (10.1)
AMENITY 0.013** 0.018** 0.016** 0.005** 0.014**
(8.81) (5.78) (7.92) (2.09) (9.52)
URBAN 0.016** 0.015** 0.011** 0.015** 0.015**
(7.14) (2.64) (4.12) (3.85) (7.16)
–0.012** –0.014** –0.019** –0.0003 –0.012**
(5.31) (3.14) (6.36) (0.08) (5.62)
ln(Pt) 0.012** 0.008* 0.028** –0.006** 0.037**
(9.55) (1.95) (7.15) (2.49) (11.5)
Constant –0.023* –0.020 –0.031 –0.011
(1.88) (0.78) (1.61) (0.42)
R
2 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.21
c1: ln(Pt) 0.058** 0.010 –0.215 0.107** —
(8.15) (0.34) (–1.37) (3.68)
c2: [ln(Pt)]
2 –0.003** 0.013 0.053 –0.008** –0.003**
(2.79) (1.04) (1.86) (2.96) (6.56)
c3: ln(Jt/Pt) –0.157** –0.186** –0.148** –0.165** –0.020**
(16.3) (8.52) (–8.52) (–8.74) (4.32)
c4: ln(Wt) –0.081** –0.005 –0.113** –0.113** –0.009*
(5.81) (–0.19) (5.49) (5.01) (1.91)
c5: URBAN –0.005** –0.019 –0.003 –0.008 0.015**
(0.77) (1.00) (0.35) (0.76) (7.16)
Constant 0.507** –0.206 1.14** 0.690** 0.012
(3.91) (0.79) (3.64) (3.07) (0.25)
R
2 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.25
N 3685 935 1828 922 3685
Test of Structural Equivalence 13.0**
Sum of Coefficients
γ0 + Γ1 + Γ2 + ΓS 0.07 –0.17 0.04 0.46
Test of Wage Bill Growth Neutrality4.5** 14.8** 1.09 48.8**
aRobust t-statistics in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the .10 level. Two
asterisks indicate significance at the .05 level.
bPredicted, based on the Stage 1 equation below.
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752 JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 41, NO. 4, 2001measuresincludelocal taxrevenuepercapita,local outstanding debtpercapita,
local per capita expenditures on education, roads, and other services, and per
capita expenditures paid for by state and federal sources. All measures were in
log form. We would expect local taxes to lower residential utility while local
expenditures and outside infusion of funds should raise residential utility.
The results of the unconstrained form of the earlier models, incorporating
local government fiscal variables,are reported in Table 5.The estimation allows
for correlated errors across counties at one point in time and across time for
individual counties. As is clear, adding the local fiscal variables does not affect
the magnitude or significance of the coefficients on variables included before.
Sign reversals only occur in two instances where coefficients are virtually zero
in magnitude and significance. Complementary growth is still shown to span a
radius of three counties. As before, a unit increase in AMENITY raises popula-
tion growth by 1.4 percent every five years, an increase in residential costs
lowers population growth modestly, and urban areas and more populated areas
grow faster.
Adding the fiscal variables does help to explain population growth: the
chi-square test restricting the  fiscal  coefficients  to zero  is  easily rejected.
However,theHamilton assumption ofneutrallocal fiscalpolicy coefficients(tax,
debt, education, roads and other local expenditures) summed to –0.001 and the
sum was not significantly different from zero. The infusion of state or federal
funds did raise local population growth, but the elasticity was very small, 0.01.
The implication of Table 5 is that locally financed government services have a
negligible effect on local population growth.
7. IMPLICATIONS
This paper uses spatially differentiated economic growth to determine the
relationship between counties in terms of complementary or competing growth.
We found that complementary economic growth spans a radius of three counties
for all but the largest counties. Those counties experience complementary
growth with adjacent counties. These spatial patterns are robust to differences
in estimation procedure, included variables, and measure of economic growth.
Given the generally uniform structure and size of the counties in our study,this
result is consistent with studies that define the local labor market by a one-way
commuting time of up to an hour.16
We find that the largest counties have a comparative advantage in attract-
ing migrants.When economic growth occurs in all regions,the smallest counties
get smaller and the largest counties get larger. The smallest counties benefit
less from their own growth, and lose more from growth occurring elsewhere.
Renkow (1996) found that rural wages were more sensitive tolocal labor market
shocks than were urban wages. This is consistent with our finding that rural
population growth is less sensitive to local wage shocks. If rural labor supply is
16See So, Orazem, and Otto (2001).
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KHAN, ORAZEM, & OTTO: SPATIAL LABOR MARKETS 753TABLE 5: Replication of Spatially Differentiated Models Incorporating
Government Fiscal Variablesa
Growth Indicator
Wages Jobs Wage Bill
121212
Γ1: Adjacent County 0.104** 0.103** 0.068** 0.068** 0.057** 0.056**
(6.47) (6.56) (6.56) (6.76) (8.03) (8.19)
Γ2: Nonadjacent
County 0.081** 0.083** 0.032** 0.030** 0.026** 0.024**
(4.55) (4.70) (3.18) (3.05) (3.56) (3.47)
ΓS: State –0.221** –0.193** –0.150** –0.140** –0.139** –0.128**
(6.73) (5.77) (7.18) (6.78) (9.16) (8.37)
AMENITY 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013**
(5.42) (5.37) (5.00) (4.90) (5.15) (5.10)
URBAN 0.023** 0.022** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021**
(6.25) (6.27) (5.72) (5.75) (5.82) (5.84)
–0.018** –0.018** –0.022** –0.022** –0.019** –0.019**
(10.1) (8.47) (11.9) (9.70) (10.8) (8.85)
ln(Pt) 0.027** 0.027** 0.025** 0.026** 0.025** 0.026**
(7.16) (5.59) (6.14) (5.04) (6.46) (5.10)
[ln(Pt)]
2 –0.003** –0.002** –0.003** –0.002** –0.003** –0.002**
(4.19) (3.39) (3.50) (2.81) (3.81) (3.10)
ln(Jt/Pt) 0.012** 0.018** 0.015** 0.022** 0.016** 0.022**
(1.67) (2.45) (2.21) (2.86) (2.37) (2.97)
ln(Wt) 0.007 0.003 0.003 –0.003 0.003 –0.0001
(0.88) (0.45) (0.053) (0.44) (0.42) (0.03)
ln(Tax) –0.009 –0.008 –0.008
(1.49) (1.33) (1.43)
ln(Debt) 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(2.80) (2.61) (2.62)
ln(Education) 0.014 0.016* 0.015*
(1.62) (1.73) (1.68)
ln(Roads) –0.005* –0.006* –0.005*
(1.81) (1.90) (1.67)
ln(Other Expenditures) –0.006** –0.007** –0.006**
(2.93) (3.11) (2.90)
ln(State and Federal) 0.010** 0.010** 0.009**
(2.91) (2.66) (2.62)
Constant 0.0001 –0.017 0.036 0.062 .00001 0.025
(0.001) (0.24) (0.52) (0.85) (0.001) (0.34)
R
2b 0.23 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.25 0.27
N 3685 3685 3685 3685 3685 3685
Government Impact χ
2(6) 51.6** 48.8** 46.86**
Local Fiscal Neutrality
Sum: Local Fiscal –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
Impact χ
2(1) 0.07 0.002 0.02
aMaximumlikelihoodcontrollingforrandomeffectsforeachcountyandtimeperiod. t-statistics
in parentheses. One asterisk indicates significance at the .10 level. Two asterisks indicate signifi-
cance at the .05 level.
bFrom the least-squares estimate of the specification.
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754 JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, VOL. 41, NO. 4, 2001less elastic, demand shocks will cause larger wage reactions in rural markets
than in urban markets.
What do these results tell us about economic policy options? These results
suggest that economic development strategies should be regionally based. By
coordinating their efforts, counties can take advantage of the spillover benefits
that exist between counties. If agglomeration economies are important, these
results suggest that they will depend upon the concentration and mix of firms
and workers across an area that includes the own county, its neighbors,and the
neighbors’ neighbors.17 Agglomeration  economies do  not require that each
county have the same mix and concentration of firms and workers as long as
the mix and concentration occurs somewhere in the commuting region.
Informulatingpolicyforthesmallestcounties,itappearsthatjobsaremore
important than wages in stimulating population growth. Therefore, it may be
counterproductive to concentrate on creation of high-wage jobs as opposed to
policies that encourage job growth when designing development policies for
rural counties. Once again, rural counties also benefit from job and income
growth in their neighboring counties,so cooperative development efforts among
rural counties are most likely to be successful. Local exogenous amenities
related to climate or geological features have a small positive effect on popula-
tion growth. However, rental costs retard population growth. To the extent that
housing costs reflect naturally occurring local amenities, the net effect of the
amenities will be reduced. Finally, locally financed government services do not
appear to be a promising avenue for attracting new residents. The net effect of
local government tax and expenditure policies on population growth is virtually
zero.
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